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4.

The Church's Bid for Intellectual Leadership

We have already noted the Church's claim to teach "in all
its fulness every doctrine that men ought to be brought to know,
and that regarding things visible and invisible, in heaven and
on earth . " During the Dark Ages it was too busy with other
~ oblems to be able to concern itself much with education.
~ile there were sporadic attempts earlier, it was only during
the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the Church turned more
seriously to the problem of educating its members . This work ~
was carried on primarily in the monastery and cathedral schools.
But, because the monasteries of this time were mainly concerned
with their own internal problems of reform, and because they
were ill-equipped to take care of students who might not be
monastically minded, the work of education fell mainly on such
cathedral schools as those at Canterbury, Paris, Chartres, and
To led~
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Lfhe curriculum of these schools included the trivium (triple way) and the quadrivium w.g ich, when taken together, were .
called the seven liberal arts . Grammar, rhetoric, and logic made
up the former . Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music m~
ae ~
up the latter . The textual materials which were used were of
two major types . There were the encyclopedic compilations with
P1
their commentaries, as well as various odd bits of material
· ~
which had in common only the fact that most of tpem had been ~;:;~
preserved by the early medieval Neoplatonists . These odd bi tSI V/~~ ·
included Roman textbooks on grammar, rhetoric, and science; a ~
part of Plato's Timaeus; and parts of some of Aristotle's works
on logic.
A curriculum based on such materials was ill-equipped
to meet the demands that were soon to be m~de upon ~ >

et

1TI1ere were two major factors which helped to change these
earl,-schools into what we know today as the medieval universities. One was the demand made by the Church and the rising
states and cities for an enlarged understanding of legal theory
and practice commensurate with their expanding administrations.
The other factor was the appearance from obscure beginnings of
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new materials, wllich eventually superseded the or§} Before the
Crusades there was a r evival of interest in Roman law and medicine in the older Italian schools . There were also some points
of contact with the Moslem East through Spain and Sicily, wh~ch
the Crusades se r ved to expand.
Most important ' of the Italian
contri butions were the commentary on civil law made by Irnerius
( c . 1050 - c . 1130) and Gratian's digest of canon law, called
t he Concord of Discordant Canons. Some of the more important
mater ials which came from elsewhere were: Aver-roes' Canon of
Medic ine, Ar abic arithmetic (including Arabic numerals whiGnwere a g r eat impr ovement over the old Roman numerals), Euclid's
wo r ks on geometry, Ptolemy's Almagest, and the medical works of·
Hippocrates and Galen.
To meet the new demands of church, state, and city with
the new materials the universities were founded.
Some of them
were the outgrowth of the cathedral schools, others simply
sprang up in t he pl aces where outstanding teachers were transl at ing, dis c ssing, and interpreting these works. At first the
u n iversities tended to ·specialize in one subject. This meant
that the early medieval students were forced to wander from
place to place in search of the new knowledge.
Later the universities came to offer a more com let
·on, the studium
generale as it was called .
By the thirteenth century the map of Europe was fairly well
do tted with universities whose names have come down to us today:
Salerno, Bologna, Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Montpellier, Toulouse, and Salamanca, to name but a few.
Later schools were
sometimes founded by the secession of students or faculty from
exi st i ng institutions, or by the action of the Church or of
secular rulers . Between the schools in Italy and those in the
northe r n part of Europe there was an interesting difference.
The Italian students were generally older and more interested
in p r ofessional training, much like the graduate students of
t oday. They created their own organization which made the rules
f o r academic · matters, down to such details as exactly how the
maste r s shou ld deliver their lectures . The Italian masters
countered with an organization of their own to work with the
students . In the North, where the students tended to be younger,
the master s had an easier time dominating the academic scene.
~ 1 500 there were more than seventy universities in Europe.
~
They r epresent another of the major contributions of the Middle
Ages to Wes t ern Civilizatio~
·he structure of the universities was similar to that of
t he othe r bodies within the organism of medieval society. There
were the various degrees, which we still use today: scholar,
bachelor, master, and doctor; corresponding to those within the
guilds : apprentice, journeyman, and master. Usually the bachel o r 's degree meant that one had completed the trivium, and the
master's degree that one had completed the quadrivium. To recei ve a doctor's degree a student had to spend several more years
in s u ch special subjects as law, medicine, or theology. The
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advanced degrees of master and doctor conferred on one the
r i ght and the r esponsibility to teach -- hence the original
meaning of the word "commencement." To the sacerdotium and
Lregnum there could now be added as a major element of the medieval landscape the studi u~

(

~e medieval scholars, or schoolmen (scholastici), were the
source of what we know as scholasticism, the teaching of the
medieval universities . The way of teaching developed in these
schools determined the very nature of scholasticism. The teachers read f r om what few books they had and commented on them.
Their lectures were taken down by the students in the form of
no t es which were later reworked in company with other students.
In addition to taking examinations, the students were called
upon to engage in disputation~, in which both sides of each
~
question would be argued . The attendant freedom of discussion,
limited to the universities, served to balance the less creative
wor k of note and e x ami nation. taki ng . The high points of univers ity life were the debates between the masters and doctors
t hemselves on the mor e important questions of the day. "Nothing
is known perfectly," wrote Robert of Sorbonf'l 1201-~74) , "which
has not ~ -=~ated )l~ } h~_ tee~ h _qf disputatio . ~dZi'.,,...k
~
,_.•.zx.;tT~tuJ ~~e:.:.;~~ ~ ~
~a. ..z .
-7--In t e process of these disputation there would be much ~
qu oting from ancient authorities. One of the major sources for
such quotations was the Sic et Non (Yes and No) , of Peter Abelard
( 1079-1142) . This was a comj)TlatTon<>I various· authorities, _ill
of them arranged on opposite sides of such major questions as
hose concern1ng
·
sacramen s w e er
supported b human reason and whether onl Eve,
am, was eguiled in the
den.
Abelard's
e 1 e sug ests , came to no conclusion because of
his belief hat "b dalbtin g we come o 1n u1r , an
inquiry
we perceive the truth .
ecause of their reliance on :autho rity
and their almost complete lack of reference to experience, these
debates may appear ludicrous to us today . This is particularly
true when the scholars decided how many teeth a horse should have
without looking into t he mouth of a sing le horse. Because of the
deprecatory attitude toward experience, the disputation was the
means by which any qu esti n was finally decided.

~

~

~

~~

is method o learning did have certain very important
advantages . It served to make past knowledge available as a
common tradition for all scholars . It served to make them aware
of the importance of language and sensitive. to the meanings of
words.
It served to develop a lively concern for logical con- ~
sistency . And it helped to produce minds tha t were sharp and
agile, quick to see inconsistencies and weaknesses in their opponents' arguments. Minds so rained ould be and were eventual! tur d to problems other than those which concerned the
early schoolmen ) f~~ ..e..Ma/~~~~
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~out 1200 the whole body of Aristotelian writings began
to be available in Europe . In addition to the complete logic
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there finally appeared his works on scie~e, ethics, politics,
rhetoric, metaphysics, and aesthetics. L!hile this material
supplied a body of integrated thoug ht, it also represented a
challenge to the thought of the times.
Now, for the first
~
time, Western Christendom was faced with a complete and selfsufficient body of ideas based on reason alone, and having no
place for faith or revelation in any form whateve~ There was
no Christ or church in Aristotelian thought . Clearly , here was
a challenge to the intellectual supremacy of tbe Church which
could not be avoide ~
Before we come to the ways in which the Church tried to
meet this challenge, we must note that there were reasons why
it was not completely satisfied with the state of philosophical
thought at this time. The thought of Augustine had been broken
up in the centuries that followed his death. One strand had
taken the form of a success religion, whi c h guaranteed worldly
success to Chri st i an believers.
Another strand followed the
appr oach of Gregory the Great in emphasizing the necessity for
outward conformity to Church regulations.
A third strand had
taken a definitely mystical turn, one whi ch tended to see the
Church as something less than necessary for man's salvation.
r,;.:oplatonism was perhaps the most prominent school of
But as then being used it
had serious weaknesses.
In the first place, its concept of the
world's emanating from God tended to discount the Christian
idea of creation.
In the second place, and closely related to
emanation, there was the idea that because God was intimately
related to the world in the form of the Logos, it might be possible to work one's way up to Him without benefit of church or V
faith.
Thirdly, as the Logos operated by means of the universal
forms, there was always a tendency for the forms to absorb the
individual thing or person into the universal and reduce it to
nothing but a specimen or illustration of the universal.
Finally,
there was always a strong mystical tendency in Neoplatonism.
These reasons help to explain why neither it nor Augustin~ism
satisfied completely many thinkers of the High Middle Age ~

thou~ during the twelfth century.

(

~ere were at least two reasons why the thought of Aristotle
represented a challen ge to these same thinkers.
First, this
material had come from the hands of infidels and unbelievers -Moslems, Greeks, and Jews . Secondly, it was clearly not in harmony with Christian teaching at certain major points.
Aristotle
taught the eternity of the world, which was contrary to the
~
Christian insistence on its creation.
As we have already noted,
there was no room in his thought for faith or the Church.
Further, his interpretat i on of the active part of man's mind as
nothing but a part of the universal Mind, even though he called
the larger Mind God, seemed a clearcut denial of both man's individuality and immortality.
·

t(he

Church's first reaction was to QQlldemn
.E L..tllm h t 0 f
Aristotle, and to prohibit some of his works from being taught
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in the schoo}s.
was necessary to find a dif e n way o
ac ~ng the problem. A
second alternative was that suggested by Averro s (1126-1198),
a Moslem physician and philosopher who 1 ved in Spain.~is was
the kind of answer that is often given even today to tne question of the relation of science and religion.
Islam, because
of its similarity to Christianity in such things as creation
and revelation, had almost the same problem when faced with the
thought of Aristotle. Averroes saw the p oblem i n terms of the
relation of hiloso hy and theo o
because the former, as it-was e ~ned at this t~me, included within it all science. And
(7~ /t he based his answer to the problem on the assumption that there
were two ki
th , one philosophical and the other the ~log~ca .
~s solution carne
o e ca e
t e octrine of double
truth.
It was loudly proclaimed at the University of Paris and ~
widely accepted because it appeared to do justice to both sides
of the debate. However, it could readily be pointed out that
this solution was neither good Christianity nor good Aristotelianism, both of which, albeit from different starting points,
held that t
omehow one a
any -- not even two.
The Averroist dualism denied the unity of truth and ence, ~n
logical terms, its very knowability. From a religious point of
view such an interpretation made a shambles of the Christian
insistence that God was one and sovereign. Averroism was therefore unacceptable to many thinke ~

V

L!he third alternative which was suggested as a solution to
the problem of the relation of philosophy and theology was that
of the Dominicans, and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 12251274). Born to a noble Italian family and educated at Monte
Cassino and the University of Naples, he joined the Dominican
Order against the wishes of his family . The greatest of the
Dominican teachers, Albertus Magnus (c. 1206 - 1280), took him
under his wing, first as pupil and then as colleague. Aquinas'
life was spent almost entirely in writing and teaching:
in
Cologne, Paris, Rome, and Naples. His most influential teaching
was done at the University of Paris, where he was sent in accordance with the Dominican policy of placing as many of their
members as possible in the universities . It was the subsequent
clash between Thomism and Averroism which lifted that university ~
to the peak of its importance. Despi t e the fact that he was immediately criticised for accepting too much of Aristotle,~
made good use of the hiloso her's reason to prove the existence
o
o ~n such a way as to bring reason to the s rv~ce o
aith.
His writings include two major works, the Summa contra Gentiles
(Summary against the Gentiles), written between 1259 and 1264,
and the Summa TheOIOgica (Summary of Theology). The latter was
begun about 1265, and although it ran to twenty-one volumes, .it
was not completed when Aquinas died, in 1274, while on his way
to the Council of Lyons. Some hint of his significance can be
gathered from the fact that he was canonized in 1323, and that
his work was declared basic for its theology by the Roman Catholic church in 187~
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Aquinas' attempt to unite philosophy and theology is just
as inescapable as the medieval cathedral's attempt to unite this
world and the next, or . ugustine's attempt to unite the two
cities . He set out to tackle this problem from the thoroughly
Christian presupposition that God has created the world, and
that, consequently, truth, if it were genuine, could not help
but lead man's mind to his Creator. Truth was, therefore,
truth, even if it came from the hands of pagans and infidels.
~uinas began with nature and science, not, as had Augustine,
with the human soul and history . From t~ere he worked his way ~
up from nature to man and finally to God . God thus became the
final cause or end which gave all else its meaning
Thus far, and in this manner, Aristotle would have argued;
but Aquinas now went beyond Aristotle, whom he believed incomplete rather than wrong.
In order for God to give real meaning
to anything He had to be the Source of its being as well as the
end of its st r i~ing.
In other words He had to be Creator, and
~
not j u st final cause . ' ~he goal of life thus became, for Thomas,
the knowledge and vision of God, to which all else was secondary.
And such a vision could only be completed in the next lifel
onsequently, for Aquinas, philosophy was secondary to
·~~~~~---~
ha separ~ (Averroes) or parallel (Augustin )
o identical Neoplatonism) . I 1
his applica 1on o
e
Greek hierarc ical p ·~~·ple to the Christian concept of God as
the Source of all being which was Aquinas' great contribution.
He was thus able to bring together under the standard of Christian thought the two main ideas of Aristotle, that of organism
(in which nothing can have a separate existence apart ffOm ever~
thing else) and l:!_ierarchM (in which everything depends for its
meaning and existence upon the thing above it) . Thus also he
was able to unite aith and reason because he saw them both as
equatlY the gift of God . Such, in briefest outline, is what is
called the Thomistic synthesi~
We can illustrate the Thomistic harmony between religion
and philosophy, faith and reason, in a number of different ways. ~
For example, God created the world out of nothing, according to
Aquinas . The world has since maintained a semi-independent
existence. This view contrasts with Augustine's belief that the
world depends directly on the will of God for its continuing existence . tlPr Aquinas the world is sustained by the presence in
it of Aristotle's universal forms which are neither separate
~
from the world nor dependent upon it . He thus avoided both the
extreme positions of realism and nominalism, as they were called
in his time.
For nominalism, nothing really existed except individual things, and the forms or universals were only names
given them for our convenience. For realiSm, nothing really existed except the universals 1 and individual things lost their
uniqueness . By insisting, with Aristotle, that the universals
were both in and above the world he was able to maintain the
view that we can come to know the world by means of our unaided
experience and reason . He believed that we could even go so far
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as to p r ove t h at his wor l d ~ ou l d n o t exist i ndep e ~en t l y of
its Cre ator .• but more than t hi s we cannot p r o v e -- we can not
prove that God h a d t o c r eate anyth1.ng . Aquinas p oved the
necessity fo r the e xistence o f Go d as Cr eator by me ans of the
five ' p r oofs whi ch are given in one o f m1r sel e ct i on0

~

If we can pro ve t hat this world is ot se l f- sus t a ining we
can al s o p r ove t hat hmnan b e i ngs, sinner s as h e y are b e cau se of
Adam 's fal l , are i n cap able o f s a ving thems l ves . The r efo r e man
is i n need o f s ometh ing more t h a n c an be ga ined by h is own effo rt s , He is in n e ed o f a Sa v io"
Bu t man canno t p r ove that
God must answer t h is need, mu s give him the gift of s al v ation.
A saVI'OUr wh ose existen ce a nd ac ti vity c ©ul d be p r oven by reason
woul d be l imi t ed t o and by the ver y reas on wh ich had p r ove d his
n e cess ity , I f man c o l d prov e that someo ne had t o g i ve him a
gi f t it wou l d no lon ger be a gift , ffhe:r:·e f or e,-man can no more
prove tha t God m s t save him t h an h e can p r ove that He had to ~
create him-;:J
h is b r in gs Aqui nas t.o t:h e l evel or dimens ion of f a ith.
He believed t h at b eyond the fir·s and final cause, whi c h we can
prove, there e x ists a n o t her a n d ever. higher a spect o f God which
is rev eal e _ to us .
Aquinas r efer s t o t his higher aspect of God
as the "Go d an- Fat her o f o • r Lo r d J es~ s Christ." Th i s is the
Saviour God, t he Go d o f t he Incarnation and the Trin i t y , This ~
leve l of fa i th, a lthough i t c an n o t be p r ov en, i s jus t a s necessary and jus t as :real as anyt h i n g that :t·· e a.son can p r ov e . Furthermo re, be ca·a
faith is the gift of Go d
al so the Creator ~we.l"S ,
Q.Q....""ir.ad c ·
b
r~:t-he~
~ t e s ang_fulfills
is
t
h
e
ork
of
t
he
Church
to con~~~~~~=z~~~~~~
ser ve and pas s on
We can s ee the same c omb ination o f fai th and re ason in
Aquinas ' te a c hi ng abou t l aw . An intel l igible wor ld mu s t be
gover ned by law . It canno t be r~ led y chance , Ind eed, for
Aquinas , the two wo rds " __ ule" and " chance" a e l o g i<rJally incompatible with each other , Law f o r him is t he p r i n ciple which
governs corp or a t e o r orga nic huma n actions , As s u ch it instructs men i n t he ways t hat t hey s h o ld ac t i n o r der to attain
human h ~ i nes s , Be cause Go d i s man ' s C:r ea t o r He i s a lso his
Ru ler , ~ ~a t God d oes no t rul E! a :rb i trarily; He ru l es a ccor ding
to l aw which is knowabl e b y ma n ' s unaided huma n reason , Here
again Aqu inas d i f fer e d fr om Augustine , who had ins is te d that in
the fall both man ' s reas o n and will we re c orrupte d . Aqu inas
v
believed t hat only man's wi l l was c orrup ted, a n d t hat t herefore
man's r eas o n , eve n that o f the i nfi del was cap ab l e of knowing
the l aws o f Go ~
her e are, a ccor d ing t o Aqu i ~as > f o r laws b y which God
rule the wor l d . The fi r st is the ete nal l a w , accor ing to
which He c reated t h e wor ld , Th e secon ~ he n~~ aw,
which i s the e te rnal law as it is imp rin t ed o n a ll cre a ted
be i n gs a n d ac cor ding t o whi ch the y hav e a natu r a l ten dency
towar d a c t ions whi c h a e p r oper t o themselves , Th e thi r d of
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these, the human law, is derived from the natural law and makes
clear ~ow the na t u r al law is to be applied in different times ,
places, and circumstances. The human law is to govern the
specific acts of historical men for the common good and, as
such, it includes the old Roman ius gentium and ius civile.
Human society , like nature, is governed by this rational law
~
which defines those things which are contrary to nature. Murder
is contrary to nature and the natural law , but we need some such
means as the human law to distinguish between murder and manslaughter. And further, if this is to be a real distinction and
not an arbitrary one, it must be based on reason.
Human society, viewed this way, does not depend either on the will of God
or on the wills of men for its reason and law.
And anyone who
tries to break these laws is, in effect, trying to break the
laws of God.
The fourth and final law is the divine law, the
gift of revelation and grace, which is applied oman s inner
motivation or will and thus completes the other thre ~
Aquinas' definition of law illustrates well the balance in
his thinking as well as his unique combination of hierarchy and
organism, within a Christian framework.
This very balance is
probably why his thought was little used in the contemporary
controversies between church and state . While his completed
definition of law as "an ordinance of reason for the common
good, ma.d e by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated" does make room for the institutions of church and state ,
he was most concerned wit h_the problems of religion and the institution of the Church. ~an needs, he argues, the authority of
God his Creator, speaking through the Scriptures, interpreted
by the popes , fathers, and councils of the Church, to set him ~
straight . In this way the faith which is transmitted by the
Church serves to save and redeem him , without ever running
counter to reaso .
Another illustration of Aquinas' synthesis ·-s.1 f"lie taken
from his ethics.
ccording to him it is possibl e ~ 0 prove by
means of reason tlie desirability of the old Greek v irtues of
courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom.
By means of reason
we can prove, contrary to Augustine's belief, that these virt u es are necessary for men as the social creatures they reall
are , organic parts of human society.
But Aquinas also believed,
and in this he agreed with Augustine, that it is impossible to
achieve the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love (charity)
without the infusion of the grace of God through the sacraments
of the Church .)
A final illustration of this unique combination may be
taken from the method that Aquinas used, especially in the
Summa Theologica. He starts in the disputational manner by
carefully defining and narrowing the question to be discussed.
He next lists the arguments against the question as he has
framed it, arguments which he calls objections.
He then goes
on to give the answers of authority. But he does not rely on
authority alone. He uses reason to prove the correctness of
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his authority. Then he goes on to answer the objections with
which he started. Thus Aquinas can begin as Abelard did, with
divergent answers to many of the questions of his day, but he
goes beyond the Sic et Non to a conclusion in agreement at one
and the same time witli DOth faith and reason.

~ considering the thought of Aquinas one point should
alwa~--be kept in mind. For all his insistence on the need for
reason and philosophy, he never asserted that these . wer~ necessary for one's s~lvation. Religion, faith, and salvation could
never depend on a certain amount of intellectual attainment. To
do so would be to deny heaven to all but . bachelors, masters , and
doctors, something which would run counter to the teachings of
the New Testament . Perhaps this is one of the ·reasons why, for
all his intellectual attainments, Aquinas was called the Angelic
Doctor~
•

~

The synthesis which St. Thomas Aquinas achieved represented
the most important bid of the medieval Church for the intellectual
leadership of Christendom.
In his own time it was criticized as
the "via moderna" and challenged from many sides. The Church
seemea-unable to devise an intellectual expression of its doc-.
trine that would go unquestioned.
The forces which were to attack Thomism and to weaken and finally break up the Church were
already at work in his own day. Meanwhile, the universities
turned their attention to other problems, survived the break-up
of the Middle Ages, and maintained an unbroken existence down to
our own time. Nevertheless , Aquinas' thought stands as one of
the major contributions of the Middle Ages to the Western World.
It is a magnificent illustration of the sheer power of the human
mind and the basis for the intellectual expression of the Roman
Catholic church' doctrine t<;>day.
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Fir s t Par t
Qu estion I
The Nature and Extent of Sacr ed Doc tri ne
To place ou r p urpose within p r oper limits, we first
endeavour to inves tigate the naLu re and extent of this
sacred doct r ine . Conce r ning t h i s the r e a r e ten points
of inqu i ry ~ -( 1 ) Whether it is necessary?
( 2 ) Whethe r it is a
science?
( 3 ) Whethe r i t i s one o r ma ny?
4 ) Whether
it is speculative or p ra c t ical?
( 5)
How it is compared
with othe r sciences?
( 6 ) Whether it is the same as
wisdom?
(7 ) Whe t h e r God is i t s s u bje c_t-matter?
(8 ) Whethe r it is a ma tte r of a r gumen t?
( 9 ) Whether
it r ightly employs me t apho r s a nd similes?
( 10 ) Whether
the Sacr ed Sc i ptur e o f this doc trine may be expounded in
d ifferent se ns es?
Fi r st Ar ticle .

Whethe r , besides philosophy, any further
doct r ine is r equ i r ed?
We proceed t hu s t o t he First Ar ti cle : -00ject1on l~t-seems t hat, beside s philosophical
science, we have no need of a n y further knowledge.
For
man should not seek t o know what is above r eason : Seek
not t he things that a r e t oo high fo r the e (Ecclus . ~
"2"2T .---su t whateve r is not ab o v~ r easollTS fully treated
of in philosophical science . crh e refore any other knowledge ~
besides philosophical science is s u per flu ou s .
Obj . 2 . Fur ther, knowledge can be concerned only with
being~o r-noth ing c a n be k n own, save what is true; and all
that is, is true . ~u t ever ything t hat is, is treated of
i n philosophical sci e nce -- e ven God Himself; so that there
is a part of ph ilos ophy called t h e ology, o r the divine
~
science, as Ar isto Ll e has prove d Metaph . vi .). Therefore,
besides philosophical science , t here is no need of any
furthe r knowledge~
On t he cont rary, I t is wr i t t e n ( 2 Tim . i ii . 16) : All
Scr iptur e inspi r ed o f God is p r o f itable to teach, to re~
prove, t o corre c t, t o Tilst rct in j u st1ce. Now Scripture,
1nsp1rea-o£ God, is-no part of pni losophical science,
which has been built u p by hu man r eas o n . Therefore it is
usefu l that beside s phi l osophical scie nce t he r e ~hould be
othe r knowledge -- i . ~ ., inspi r ed o f God .
I answer t hat ,-l t was ne c essar y for man as salvation that
there-should be-a-knowledge r evealed by God, besides philosophical science built p 'by hu man reas on . Firstly, indeed, becau se man i s di r ected t o God, as to a n end that
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s u rpasses the g rasp of his reason; The eye hath not seen,
0 God , besides Thee, what t hings Thou hast preparea rorthem that wa1t ror-Thee-Tisa. lxi~)~ut the end must
fi r s t -ne-known Qrffien-wlio are to direct their though t s and
actions to the end . Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
shou ld be made k now n to him by divine revelation. Even
as r egar ds those truths abou t God which human reason could
have discove r ed, it was necessary that man should be taught
by a divine revelati on ; b ecause the truth about God such
as r eason could discover , would only be known by a few,
and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many
err ors . Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God,
depends upon the knowledge of this truth.
Therefore, in
order that the salvat ion of men might be brou ght about
more fitly and more s u rely, it was necessar y that they
shou ld be taught divine t ru ths by divine revelation .
It
was the r e fo r e n ecessar y that, besides philosophical science
bu ilt up by reason ther e should be a sacr ed science learnt
throu gh re velation .
Reply Obj . 1 . Althou gh those things which are beyond
man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his
reason , nevertheless, once they are r evealed by God they
mu st be accepted by faith . Hence the sacred text continues,
For many things are shown to thee above the understanding
~man-TEccl u s . TIT . 25) . -xna-rn this tne-sacred science
conSISts .
Reply Obj. 2.
Sciences are differentiated according to
the var 1ous means through which knowledge is obtained.
For
the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same
conclu sion -- that the earth, for instance, is round:
the
astronome r by means of mathematics (i . e., abstracting from
matte r) , but the physicist by means of-matter itself .
Hence ther e is no reason why those things which may be
lear nt from philosophical science, so far as they can be
known by natu ral reason, may no t also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation . Hence
theology included in sacred doctrine differ s in kind from
that theolo g y whic h is par t of philosophy .
Qu estion II
The Exist ence of God
Because t h e chie i aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the
knowledge of God, no t only as He is in Himself, but also
as He is the beginni n g of things and their last end, and
especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has
been already said, therefore, in our endeavour to expound
this science, we shall treat :
(1) Of God:
( 2 ) Of the
rational creature's advance towards God :
( 3 ) Of Christ ,
Who as man, is our way to God .
In treating of God the r e will be a thr eefold division : -For we shall consider (1) Whatever concer ns the Divine
Essence .
(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons.
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( 3 ) Whate ve r concerns the procession of creatures from
I (

Him .

I •

Conce rn ~g

the Divine Essence, we must consider : -Whe tbe r God exists? (2 ) The manner of His existence, or , r a ther, what is not the manner ~f His existence . ( 3 ) Whatever concerns 1IIS operations ~- namely,
His knowledge, wil l, power .
. Concer ni ng ~.......he fi r st, there are thr ee points of inqu J.ry : -( 1) Whether the p r oposition ' God exists ' is selfe v ident? ( 2) Whether it j s demonstraqle? (3 ) Whether
God exists?
'
( 1)

First Ar ticle .

(

Whether the existence of God is selfevident?
We pr oceed thu s to the Fir st Article : -UE,jection 1:--Tt-seems that the existence of God is
self-evldent . Now those things a r e said to be selfevi dent t o us t he knowledge of which is naturally imp l anted in - us, as we can see in regar d to first principles .
Bu t as Damascene says (De Fid . Orth . i . I, 3 ) , the kno~·
ledge of God is naturallY TmPlanied in all . Therefore
the exTSt ence-oi:God is self-evident-.---Obj . 2 . Further, those things are said to be selfevide~whTch are known as soon as the terms are known,
which the Philosopher ( I Poster. iii. ~ says is true of
the fi r st principles of demonstration , Thus, when the
nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
r ecogniz' d that every whole is greater than its part .
Bu t as soon as the signification of the wor d ' God' is
u nder stood, it is at once seen that God exists . For by
this worq is signified that thing than which nothing
gr eater can be conceived . But that which exists actually
and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally . ~herefore, since as soon as the word 'God v is
u nder stoQd it exists mentally, it also follows that it
exists aqtu ally . Therefor e the proposition 'God exists'
is self-.vident .
Obj ! 3o Further, the existence of truth is selfevide~ · For whoever denies t he existence of .truth
grants that t r uth does not exist: and, if truth does ,n ot
exist, then the proposi tion ' Truth does not exist' is
t r ue : and if there is Rnything true, there must be truth .
But God ' ~s truth itse lt : I am the way, the truth, and
the life (John xi v . · 6) . Tlierefore- 'GOd exists' is selfevident .
·
On the contrar y, No one can mentally admit the opposite or-wnat is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph .
iv . , lect . vi . ) states concerning the first principles of
demonstr ation . But the opposite of the proposition 'God
is w can be mentally admitted : The fool said in his he'a rt,
There is no God (Ps . lii . 1 ). ~refore, that:Goa-exists
l.S not-seTI-evident .
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of
two ways ; on tne-0ne harid , self-evident in itself, though
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not to u s ; on the o ther, self-evident in itself, and to
us . A p r oposit i on i s self-evident because the predicate
is included in the essence of the s ubj ect, as 'Man is an
animal, ? for animal i s contained in the essence of man.
If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be
known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all;
as is clear with r e gard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no
one is ignorant of, s u ch as being and non-being, whole and
part, and suchl ike .
If, howeve r , there are some to whom
the essence of the p r edi cate an d subject is u nknown, the
proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to
those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and
subject of the propos ition . The r efore, it happens, as
Boethius says ( Hebdom . , t he title of which is :
'Whether
all that is, is good' ) , 'that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal s u bstances a r e not in space . ' Therefore I say
that this proposition, ' God exists,' of itself is selfevident, for the p r edicate is the same as the subject;
because God is His own existence as will be hereafter
shown (Q . III . , A. 4) . Now because we do not know the
essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to
us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
known to us, though less known in their nature -- namely,
by effects .
Reply Obj . 1 . To know that God exists in a general
and confuseaway-is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch
as God is man's beat itude . For man naturally desires
happiness, and what is natur ally desired by man must be
naturally known to him . This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone
is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is
approaching, even though it is Pete r who is approaching;
for many the r e are who imagi ne that man's perfect good
which is happine ss , consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else .
Reply Obj , 2 . Perhaps not everyone who hears this
word 'God' understands it to si gnify something than which
nothing greater can be thought , seeing that some have
believed God to be a body . Yet, granted that everyone
understands that by this word 'God ' is signified something
than which nothing greater can be tho ught, nevertheless,
it does not therefore follow that he understands that
what the word si gnifies exists actually, but only that it
exists mentally . Nor can it be argued tha t it actually
exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists
somethin g than which nothin g g reater can be thou g ht; and
this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God
does not exist .
Reply Obj . 3 . The existence of truth in general is
self-eviden~bu t the existence of a Primal Truth is not
self-evident to u s.
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Whether it can be demonstrated that God
exists?
We p r oceed thus to the Second Article : -ODjection 1-.---It seems that the ex1stence of God cannot
be demonstrated-:- Fo r it is an article of faith that God
exists . But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of t h e u nseen (Heb . xi . l ). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Obj , 2 . Fur ther , the essence is the middle term of
demonstratTon . But we cannot know in what God's essence
consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says ( De Fid . Orth . i . 4 ), Therefore we cannot demonstrate tha~Goa-exists .
Obj . 3 . Fur ther, if the existence of God were demonstratecl," t1iis could only be from His effects.
But His
effects are not p r opo r tionate to Him, since He is infinite
and His effects are fi nite; and between the finite and
infinite there is no proportion , Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated .
On the cont r a r y, The Apostle says : The invisible
things-o~im are clear ly seen, being understood by the
things that are made (Rom . ~20 ). But this woula-not be
unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through
the things that are made; for the first thing we must know
of anythin g is, whether it exists .
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways:
One is through~ cause, and is called a priori, and
this is to argue from what is prior absolutely . The other
is through the effect, and is called a demonstration a
posteriori; this is to argue from what is prior relatTvely
only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the
cause . And from every effect the existence of its proper
cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon
its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.
Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not selfevident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us ,
Reply Obj . l , The existence of God and other like
truths abou t God~ which can be known by natural reason,
are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge , even as
grace presupposes nature , and perfection supposes something that can be perfected . Nevertheless, there is
nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself
is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
Reply Obj , 2 , When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of
the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's
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existence. This is especially the case in regard to God,
because, in order to p r ove the existence of anything, it
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its
essence follows on the question of its existence. Now
the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His
effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of
the word 'God. '
Reply Obj . 3 . From effects n~ t proportionate to the
cause no perfect-knowledge of that cause can be obtained.
Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be
clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence .

(

Third Article . Whether God exists?
We proceed fhus t o t he Thi r d Article : -00ject1on l~t-seems that God does not exist; because
if one
two contraries
infinite, the other wou
be alto ether destro
But the word 'God' means that He is
infinite goodness . If, therefore, God existed, there would
be no evil discovera e; but there is evil in the world. ~
Therefore God~oes not exisJ)
Obj . 2 , LEUrther~ it is s u perfluous to suppose that what
can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced
by many . But it seems that everything we see in the world
can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God
did not exist . i'o r all natur al things can be reduced to
one principle, wElch is nature; and all voluntary things
~
can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or

:~~~ ~~ ~~se:: ~e~~~~~;d'w~

_ On th¢~o6trar y, It is sa ?~in -the person of God:
I am
Whol am-(Exod . iii . 14 ) .
----- -r answer that, The existence of God can be proved in
five wa s .
-e first and nore manifest way is the argument from ,_,.
motio
It is cer tain, and evident to our senses, that
in the world some things are in motion . Now whatever is
in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be
in motion except it is in potential.i ty t .o that towards
which it is in ~tion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as
it is in act . ~r motion is nothing else than the redq tion of something from potentiality to actualityl
But
nothing ! Otcan be reduced from potentiality to auiiality,
except by something in a state of actuality.
bus that /
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, w ich is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it
Now it is not possible that the same thing
should be at once in actu ality and potentiality in the
same respect, but only in different respects.
For what
is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot;
but it is simultaneously potentially cold . It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same

w::~~::Jf;~.;. :-A4-~(~~~~~
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way a thing should be both move r and moved, i . e , , that it
should move itself , fthe r efor e, whatever is Tn-motion must
be put in mot i on by anothe r . If that by which it is put
in motion be itself p u t in motion, then this also must
needs be p ut in motion by another , and that by another
again . But this cannot go on to infinity , because then
there would be no fi r st move r , and, consequ ently, no other
mover; seeing that s u bsequ ent mover s move only inasmuch as
they are put in motion by the fi r st mover; as the st\if
moves only beca use it is p ut in motion by the hand . J,there-V
fore it is necessary to a rr ive a t a first mover, put in
motion by no othe r ; and thi s ever yone understands to be

Go~
~~ ,
e __§ecGmd way i s f r om the natur e of the efficient ~
cause · (!E the world o f sense we find there is an order

(

of effic1ent cau s e s.::J The r e is no case known (neither is
it inde
· e ) · which a thin is found to be the
efficient c
so it wou
to
itself, which is impossible . Now in efficient cau~ it
rs not ossible to
n t o i n fi nit ' because in all efficie
causes fol
ing in o r der, the first is the cause
of the intermediate ca ~e, and the inte
a
u..:.~~L_J..J..L~~
u~l~t::_;i~m
!!:a
!:U:
t.x...
e c ause , whether the intermediate
~~~~~~~~~o~r~~
o~
n~e~~ly .
Now to take away t ~
cause is to take away the effect . Therefore, if there be
no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate , nor any inte r mediat e cause . But if in efficient
causes it is poss i ble to go on to infinity, there will be
no first effic i ent cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any inte rme~ate efficient causes; all
of which is plainly false . ~ r efore it is necessary to
admit a fi r st efficient cau se, to which everyone gives
the name of Go~
~e thi ~ way is taken f r om possibility and necessity,
and r uns thu~ We f ind i n nature t hings that are possible
to be and not to be, s i nce they a re fo u nd to be genera ted,
and to corrupt, and -consequ ently, they are possible to be
and not to be . Bu t it is impossi ble fo r these always to
exist, fo r that whic h is possible not to be at some time
is not . ~e r efore, if ever ything is possible not to be,
then at one time the r e cou ld have been nothing in existence . Now if this wer e t rue, even now ther e would be
nothing in e x istence, becau se that which does no t exist
only begins t o e.xist by something already existing . Therefore, if at one time nothin g was in e x istence, it would
have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist;
and thus even now nothin g would be in existence -- which
is absur~ The r efore, not all beings are merely possible,
but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary , But eve r y necessar y thing either has its necessity caused by anothe r, o r not . Now it is impossible
to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their
necessity caused by ano t he r , as~ _ been already proved
in regard to efficient causes .
e r efor e we cannot but ~
postula~~~~he existence of some
eing having of itself

y
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its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
rather causing in others their necessity. This all men ~
speak _of as Godl
~e four ~way is taken from the gradation to be found ~
in things ~ Amon g beings there are some more and some less
g ood, tr~ noble, and the like , CJLut 'more' and 'less'
0/
zt~~
are predicated of different thin gs, according as they re- o?/ ~ -~
semble in their different ways something which is the max- 10 ~
imum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more~~~
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so tha t there is ~ ~
something which is truest, something best, something nob~L
lest , and, consequently, somethi n g which is uttermost ~
~~
being ; for those t hings that are greatest in truth ~e ~ ~~.
g reatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.
ow
the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that
genus; as fire, whi ch is the maximum of heat, is the
cause of all hot thi ngs . Therefore there must also be
~
something which is to all beings the cause of their being
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call Go~~
~e fifth way is taken from the governance of the wo:~~
We s~ that things which lack intelligence, such as natural
bod1es, act for an end , and t ·
t f o
ir
actin alwa s, or near! always, in the same way, so as to
obtain the be
esult . Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but desi g ne y, do they achieve their end.
ow
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move .,towards an end,
unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge ~
and intelli gence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the
archer . (therefore some intelligent being exists by whom
all natural thin~ are directed to their end; and this
bein ~ e call Go ~
J§:ply Obj . ! · ~s Augustine says (Enchir . xi . ): Since
God ~ the highest g ood , He would not allow any evil to
~ /
exis~in His works ,-unless-His omnTPQtence ana-goooness
y
were such as to bring good even out of evil~his is part
~he 1nf1nite goodness of-coG,~a~He-should allow evil
to exist, and ou t of it p roduce good~
eply Obj . 2 . Since nature wo~s for a determinate end
under t e d1rectTon of a higher agent, whatever is done by
nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first
cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be
traced back to some higher cause other than human reason
or will, since t hese can chang e and fail; for all things
that are changeable and cap able of defect must be traced
back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle,
as was shown in the body of the Article~

